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COMMENT

Flip That Prosecution Strategy:
An Argument for Using RICO to Prosecute
Large-Scale Mortgage Fraud
SHAYNA

A. HUTCHINSt

INTRODUCTION

The aftermath of the current financial crisis has
produced much debate about what should be done to
prevent similar catastrophic events in the future. It has
been argued that regulatory reform is the key to preventing
a similar crisis.1 Many analysts point to lax regulations in
the mortgage industry, specifically in the subprime sector,
as a catalyst that helped trigger the crisis in the first place.2
When the housing bubble burst in 2007, it brought the
rest of Wall Street down with it. It is clear now that risky
subprime mortgages issued to unqualified borrowers by
unchecked mortgage lenders were the core components of

t J.D. Candidate, Class of 2011, University at Buffalo Law School, State
University of New York; M.B.A. Candidate, Class of 2011, University at Buffalo
School of Management, State University of New York; B.A., 2007, American
University.
1. See generally Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed.
Reserve Sys., Monetary Policy and the Housing Bubble, Address at the Annual
Meeting of the American Economic Association (Jan. 3, 2010), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20lOOl O3a.pdf.
2. Id. at 16, 20; see also DENISE JAMES ET AL., ELEVENTH PERIODIC MORTGAGE
FRAuD CASE REPORT To MORTGAGE BANKERS ASS'N 1 (2009); Andrew J. Ceresney

et al., Regulatory Investigations and the Credit Crisis: The Search for Villains,
46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 225, 230-31 (2009).
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financial disaster.3 It is also clear that not all borrowers
were innocent victims in pursuit of the American dream to
own a home. There were also criminals who took advantage
of rising housing prices and lax lending requirements in
order to turn a profit.4
This Comment explores the prosecution of these
criminals and how prosecution strategies should change
given the severity of the financial crisis they helped fuel.
Part I of this Comment briefly discusses the impact of
mortgage fraud on the United States economy in the past
ten years, what mortgage fraud is, and how it works. Part II
discusses current mortgage fraud prosecution strategies and
why they are inadequate. Part III makes an argument for
prosecuting large-scale mortgage fraud under The
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
("RICO"),5 including an examination of the required
statutory elements and how they are met by mortgage fraud
perpetrators.
I. THE MECHANICS OF MORTGAGE FRAUD
A. The Impact of Mortgage Fraud
According to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
("FDIC"), United States commercial banks currently hold
over $3.7 trillion in domestic real estate loans.6 About $2.3
trillion of this sum represents loans on residential
properties.7 The remainder of real estate loans held by
United States commercial banks represent loans for

3. See Monica Pinciak-Madden & Katya Jestin, Subprime Crisis, N.Y.L.J.,
Jan. 5, 2009, at S4.
4. See, e.g., Todd J. Zywicki & Joseph D. Adamson, The Law and Economics
of Subprime Lending, 80 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 3 (2009); see also 2008 Mortgage
Fraud Report, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/publications/
fraud/mortgage_fraud08.htm (last visited Oct. 14, 2010).
5. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (2006).

6. Real Estate Loans: FDIC-InsuredCommercialBanks, United States, FED.
DEPOSIT INS. CORP., http://www2.fdic.gov/hsob/hsobRpt.asp (follow "Commercial
Bank Reports" hyperlink; then follow "CB12: Real Estate Loans" hyperlink)
(last visited Oct. 14, 2010).

7. Id.
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construction, land development, and cultivation of
farmland.8
"Industry experts estimate that up to 10% of all
residential loan applications. . . have some form of material
misrepresentation, both inadvertent and malicious."9 Of
loans that experience early payment defaults-often a red
flag for problem loans-45-50% of these loans are made on
the basis of misrepresentation.'" Of loans that enter into
foreclosure, about 25% have "at least some element of
misrepresentation.""
The Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") estimates
that mortgage fraud causes between $4 billion to $6 billion
in losses annually.'2 In fiscal year 2008, 63,173 mortgage
fraud Suspicious Activity Reports ("SARs") were filed with
the FBI.'3 In the first four months of 2009, the number of
mortgage fraud SARs filed was already 40,901.' 4 Also, in
just the first four months of 2009, the FBI already had 2440
mortgage fraud investigations pending and had opened 965
new mortgage fraud cases.'5
The recent influx of investigations and ensuing
litigation may be just the beginning. 6 The Mortgage Asset
Research Institute ("MARI") suggests that "reported
mortgage fraud is more prevalent now than in the heyday of
the origination boom"' 7 and predicts that "mortgage fraud is
8. Id.
9. FED. FIN. INSTS. EXAMINATIONS COUNCIL, THE DETECTION, INVESTIGATION,
AND DETERRENCE OF MORTGAGE LOAN FRAUD INVOLVING THIRD PARTIES: A WHITE

PAPER 2
(2005) [hereinafter
FFIEC WHITE PAPER],
http://www.ffiec.gov/_exam/3PMtgFraud-wp-octO4.pdf.

available

at

10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Just the Facts: The Latest Mortgage Fraud Statistics, FED. BUREAU OF
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/white-collar/mortgagefraud/mortgagefraud (last visited Nov. 3, 2010).
INVESTIGATION,

13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. See Pinciak-Madden & Jestin, supra note 3, at S5 (stating that the postcrisis situation is getting worse and predicting an increase in both civil suits
and criminal investigations surrounding mortgage fraud).
17. JAMES ET AL., supranote 2, at 1.
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[still] on the rise.""8 As a result, "[e]merging fraud trends are
further draining lender, law enforcement, and consumer
resources in the industry's most challenging times." 9
As one Deputy Attorney General noted recently,
"[m]ortgage fraud and related securities fraud pose a
significant threat to our economy, to the stability of our
nation's housing market and to the peace of mind of millions
of American homeowners. 2 ° When we consider the overall
impact of mortgage fraud on our economy and the role it
played in the recent financial crisis, it becomes clear that
the legal and law enforcement communities must take a
strong stance against it.2 1 We must examine both the inner
workings of mortgage fraud, and how it can be prevented in
the future through the use of strong prosecution and
sentencing methods.
B. How MortgageFraudWorks
The FBI defines mortgage fraud as "a material
misstatement, misrepresentation, or omissions relied upon
by an underwriter or lender to fund, purchase, or insure a
loan. 22 There are two types of mortgage fraud: fraud for
housing and fraud for profit.2 3 Fraud for housing occurs
when an applicant commits mortgage fraud for the purpose
of obtaining a primary residence. 24 Fraud for profit occurs
when one or more individuals commit mortgage fraud for
the purpose of gaining illegal profits from the loans. 25 Fraud
18. Id. at 8.
19. Id.
20. Press Release, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, More Than 400 Defendants
Charged for Roles in Mortgage Fraud (June 19, 2008), available at
http://www.fbi.gov/news/pressrel/press-releases/more-than-400-defendantscharged-for-roles-in-mortgage-fraud.
21. See Holly A. Pierson, Mortgage Fraud Boot Camp: Basic Training on
DefendingA Criminal Mortgage Fraud Case, CHAMPION, Sept./Oct. 2007, at 14,
21 ("The tumultuous state of the mortgage industry, combined with increasing
reports of millions of dollars of loss from mortgage fraud schemes, has created
the perfect storm for law enforcement initiatives.").
22. 2008 Mortgage FraudReport, supra note 4.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.

2011]

RICO AND MORTGAGE FRAUD

297

for profit "often involves multiple loans and elaborate
schemes perpetrated to gain illicit proceeds from property
sales."26 For the purpose of this Comment and the argument
for prosecuting large-scale mortgage fraud through RICO,
we are more concerned with fraud for profit.
The schemes that are executed to commit fraud for
profit are limited only by the creativity and imagination of
those committing the mortgage fraud.27 "Though one may
commit mortgage fraud by a single act, mortgage fraud
usually involves a combination of bad acts."" While
countless schemes exist, the most basic fraud for profit
involves the following:
* Perpetrators will submit false loan documents in
order to purchase a property. Often, middlemen referred to
as "straw buyers"29 will be recruited to apply for the
fraudulent mortgages. The documents may include
misstatements regarding an applicant's income, occupation,
intent to occupy the property, etc.
o An appraiser will value the property to make sure it is
consistent with the amount of the loan being issued. The
appraisal may also be fraudulent, certifying that the
property is worth more than its true value, thereby securing
an inflated loan amount.
* The documents are submitted to a mortgage loan
originator who signs off on the documents, certifying the
value of the property, the loan, and the applicant's ability to
repay the lender.
e The property is then closed on by an attorney who
verifies that all documents are in order and properly filed,
and secures the release of the loan proceeds to the buyer.
* Once the loan proceeds are released, the perpetrators
take the money and split the proceeds among those involved

26. Id.
27. FFIEC WHITE PAPER, supranote 9, at 13.
28. See Brad R. Jacobson & Michael Barnhill, Drawing the Short StrawMortgage Fraudand Straw Buyers, UTAH BAR J., July/Aug. 2008, at 9.
29. For a more detailed explanation of "straw buyers" and "straw borrowers,"
see FFIEC WHITE PAPER, supranote 9, at 17.
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in the scheme. Payments are not made on the mortgage and
the home falls into foreclosure."
Some of the more popular schemes include property
flipping,31 builder-bailouts,32 short sales,33 foreclosure
rescue, reverse mortgages,35 and identity theft 6 Due to
30. See Jacobson & Barnhill, supra note 28, at 9-10; 2007 Mortgage Fraud
Report,
FED.
BUREAU
OF
INVESTIGATION,
http://www.fbi.gov/
publications/fraud/mortgage-fraud07.htm (last visited Oct. 14, 2010); FFIEC
WHITE PAPER, supranote 9, at 5-17.
31. Jacobson & Barnhill, supra note 28, at 9 ("Property flipping occurs when
property is purchased, fraudulently appraised for a higher value, and then sold
at the inflated price."); see also 2007 MortgageFraudReport, supra note 30.
32. Builder-bailout schemes occur when a builder
fraudulent means to dispose of property they cannot sell:

or

developer uses

For example, a builder wishes to sell a property for $200,000. He
inflates the value of the property to $240,000 and finds a buyer. The
lender funds a mortgage loan of $200,000 believing that $40,000 was
paid to the builder, thus creating home equity. However, the lender is
actually funding 100[%] of the home's value. The builder acquires
$200,000 from the sale of the home, pays off his building costs, forgives
the buyer's $40,000 down payment, and keeps any profits.
2007 Mortgage FraudReport, supranote 30.
33. A short sale is a pre-foreclosure sale where the lender who holds the
mortgage agrees to sell the property for less than is owed on the mortgage:
In a typical short sale scheme, the perpetrator uses a straw buyer to
purchase a home for the purpose of defaulting on the mortgage. The
mortgage is secured with fraudulent documentation and information
regarding the straw buyer. Payments are not made on the property
loan so that the mortgage defaults. Prior to the foreclosure sale, the
perpetrator offers to purchase the property from the lender in a shortsale agreement. The lender agrees without knowing that the short sale
was premeditated.

Id.
34. In foreclosure rescue scams, perpetrators fraudulently convince
homeowners that they can save their homes from pending foreclosure through
"deed transfers and the payment of up-front fees." Id. Victims often pay the
perpetrators in large lump sums for their services. Sometimes the perpetrators
will take the money and run. Other times they will sell the home out from under
the original homeowner or secure a second loan without the homeowner's
knowledge, stripping the home of its equity. Id.
35. Reverse mortgages are targeted at senior citizens. They allow the elderly
to borrow funds against the equity they have built up in their homes. While
reverse mortgages are legal and often helpful to senior citizens, many scam
artists are now getting into the business, charging exorbitant fees and illegally
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their complexity, such schemes usually require several
participants.37 Multiple perpetrators may be involved at
each step, including mortgage brokers, lenders, appraisers,
underwriters, accountants, real estate agents, settlement
attorneys, land developers, investors, builders, bank
account representatives, investment banks, and credit
rating agencies.38 Often, since those already working in the
mortgage industry are familiar with both the mortgage loan
process and with one another, they will work together in
order to "exploit vulnerabilities in the system."39

II. THE CHALLENGES OF FRAUD PROSECUTION
A. CurrentProsecutionStrategies
"While there is no federal mortgage fraud statute per se,
federal law enforcement authorities have at their disposal a
wide variety of existing criminal statutes to investigate and
prosecute mortgage fraud schemes . . . "" The most
commonly used statutes include bank fraud, wire fraud,
mail fraud, false statements, money laundering, and
conspiracy."
Bank fraud occurs when a person "knowingly executes,
or attempts to execute, a scheme or artifice" (1) "to defraud
a financial institution;" or (2) "to obtain any of the moneys,
funds, credits, assets, securities, or other property owned
by, or under the custody or control of, a financial institution,
siphoning off a portion of the proceeds for themselves. See Charles Duhigg,
Tapping Into Homes Can Be Pitfallfor the Elderly, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2008, at
Al.
36. Identity theft occurs when a mortgage fraud perpetrator "obtains
confidential personal information (i.e., social security numbers, name, date of
birth) about a person" and then uses the information to either apply for a
mortgage loan without their knowledge, or apply for a home equity line of credit
on the property they already own. Pierson, supra note 21, at 17. For a more
detailed explanation of additional mortgage fraud schemes, see Howard A. Lax,
Recognizing Mortgage Fraud,MICH. B.J., Nov. 2007, at 34, 35-39.
37. Jacobson & Barnhill, supranote 28, at 9.
38. 2008 Mortgage FraudReport, supra note 4.
39. 2007 Mortgage FraudReport, supra note 30.
40. Pierson, supra note 21, at 15.
41. See Jacobson & Barnhill, supra note 28, at 10-11.
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by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, reputations, or
promises."" Bank fraud is punishable by a maximum fine of
$1 million, a maximum of thirty years imprisonment, or
both.43
Wire fraud is committed when a person "having devised
or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or
for obtaining money or property by means of false or
or promises,
fraudulent pretenses, representations,
transmits or causes to be transmitted by means of wire,
radio, or television communication in interstate or foreign
commerce, any writings, signs, signals, pictures, or sounds
for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice."' Wire
fraud is punishable by a maximum fine of $1 million, a
maximum of twenty years imprisonment, or both.45
However, if the act affects a financial institution (as is the
case with mortgage fraud), the maximum punishment for
each act increases to a maximum fine of $1 million, a
maximum of thirty years imprisonment, or both."
Mail fraud is committed when a person "having devised
or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or
for obtaining money or property by means of false or
fraudulent pretenses . . . places in any post office or
authorized depository for mail matter, any matter or thing"
that is "to be sent or delivered by the Postal Service, or...
by any private or commercial interstate carrier."" Mail
fraud is punishable by a fine, a maximum of twenty years
imprisonment, or both. 8 However, as with wire fraud, if the
act affects a financial institution, the maximum punishment
for each act increases to a maximum fine of $1 million, a
maximum of thirty years imprisonment, or both.49
False statements occur when a person "knowingly
makes any false statement or report, or willfully overvalues
42. 18 U.S.C. § 1344 (2006).
43. Id.
44. 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2006).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2006).
48. Id.
49. Id.
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any land, property, or security, for the purpose of
influencing in any way" the actions of institutions including,
but not limited to, the Federal Housing Administration, any
Federal Reserve bank, or any institution of which the
accounts are insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation or the Office of Thrift Supervision (i.e., most
lending institutions). ° Fraudulent false statements on loan
and credit applications are punishable by a maximum fine
of $1 million, a maximum of thirty years imprisonment, or
both.'
Money laundering occurs when a person "knowingly
engages or attempts to engage in a monetary transaction in
criminally derived property of a value greater than $10,000
[that has been] derived from specified unlawful activity."52
Money laundering is punishable by a fine, a maximum of
ten years imprisonment, or both. 3 The fine is usually set at
a maximum of "twice the amount of the criminally derived
property involved in the transaction."54
Conspiracy can be charged in one of two ways. A
perpetrator may be charged with conspiracy to commit any
offense that falls under Chapter 63 of Title 18 (including
bank fraud, wire fraud, and mail fraud).5 A conspiracy to
commit such an offense is punishable by the same penalties
as those prescribed in the statute for the original offense. 6
A perpetrator may also commit conspiracy against the
United States government, which occurs when "two or more
persons conspire either to commit any offense against the
United States, or to defraud the United States, or any
agency thereof in any manner or for any purpose, and one or
more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the
conspiracy ... ."" A conspiracy to commit such an offense is
50. 18 U.S.C. § 1014 (2006).
51. Id.
52. 18 U.S.C. § 1957 (2006).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. 18 U.S.C. § 1349 (2006).
56. Id.
57. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2006). Some of the agencies affected by mortgage fraud
include the Federal Housing Administration, the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, the Federal Reserve Bank, and the Office of Thrift Supervision.

302

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59

punishable by a fine, a maximum of five years
imprisonment, or both.58
The statute of limitations for the above-mentioned
actions is generally five years.59 However, for a violation or
conspiracy to commit bank fraud, mail fraud, or wire fraud
that affects a financial institution, the statute of limitations
is extended to ten years.6"
B. A Representative Case:United States v. Stalnaker
To illustrate the use of the above-mentioned statutes in
a mortgage fraud prosecution, let us look at the recent
mortgage fraud case of United States v. Stalnaker,6 ' which
revolved around a twelve-count indictment against a dozen
defendants for their participation in a mortgage fraud
scheme.62 Richard Lucas, the leader of the scheme,
"orchestrated an elaborate mortgage fraud operation that
purchased cheap property and, through various acts of
fraud, resold it at a high price."63
As the leader, Lucas convinced two other participants
(Clark and Jones) to recruit straw buyers for the scheme.'
Lucas would then arrange for the straw buyers (Weary,
Fairley, Packer, Irby, and Jones) to purchase multiple
properties at low prices.65 The straw buyers were not
required to put any money down and "would often receive

58. Id.
59. 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (2006).
60. 18 U.S.C. § 3293 (2006).
61. 571 F.3d 428 (5th Cir. 2009). This decision consolidated United States v.
Lucas and United States v. Castle, which arose from the same series of
transactions.
62. See Press Release, U.S. Attorney's Office, S. Dist. of Miss., Seven
Defendants Sentenced in Mortgage Fraud Scheme (Feb. 22, 2007) [hereinafter
available at http://www.justice.gov/usao
Release],
Press
Sentencing
mss/feb2207_wed.html; Press Release, U.S. Attorney's Office, S. Dist. of Miss.,
Ten Defendants Named in Mortgage Fraud Conspiracy Indictment (Feb. 16,
at
available
Release],
Press
Indictment
[hereinafter
2006)
http://www.justice.gov/usao/mss/press/february2006/mortgage.html.
63. Stalnaker,571 F.3d at 432.
64. Indictment Press Release, supranote 62.
65. Id.
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cash payments for use of their names and credit ratings."66
If the straw buyers' credit would not support the mortgage
loans, Lucas would arrange for false income statements and
false bank account information to be prepared (by Cox) and
submitted to the lenders on the straw buyers' behalf.67 Once
the mortgage applications were fraudulently submitted,
Lucas would arrange for real estate appraisers (Stalnaker,
Champ, and Mosley) to prepare inflated appraisals of the
properties.68 The closing attorney for the transactions
(Castle) would list the straw buyers as having made a down
payment on the properties, "making it appear they had
equity in the properties, when in fact they did not." Once
the properties had been successfully purchased and the loan
funds released, Lucas and Castle would launder the
proceeds and use the funds to finance the ongoing scheme.7 °
The twelve participants were charged using a variety of
prosecutorial tools, including bank fraud, wire fraud,
conspiracy to commit bank fraud, conspiracy to commit wire
fraud, and conspiracy to commit money laundering.7 ' As a
result of these charges, nine of the participants pled guilty,
leaving three others (Lucas, the leader; Castle, the closing
attorney; and Stalnaker, the appraiser) to stand trial." At
trial, all three were found guilty and received the most
severe sentences of the twelve defendants.73
Lucas was sentenced to fourteen years imprisonment,
followed by five years of supervised release, and ordered to
pay approximately $1.3 million in restitution.74 Castle was
sentenced to four years imprisonment, followed by three
years of supervised release, and ordered to pay almost $1.4
66. Id.
67. Id.; see also Sentencing Press Release, supranote 62.
68. Indictment Press Release, supra note 62; see also Sentencing Press
Release, supra note 62.
69. Indictment Press Release, supra note 62.
70. Id. The names used here are not intended to confuse the reader, but
rather to illustrate the many participants involved in a single mortgage fraud
scheme.
71. Id.
72. Sentencing Press Release, supranote 62.
73. Id.; see also Stalnaker,571 F.3d at 432.
74. Sentencing Press Release, supra note 62.
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million in restitution.7 5 Stalnaker was sentenced to less
than two and a half years imprisonment, followed by five
years of supervised release, and ordered to pay just under
$1 million in restitution.76
As for the rest of the participants, the recruiters and
straw buyers received a wide variety of sentences ranging
from a minimum of three years of probation to a maximum
of just over one and a half years imprisonment, and had to
pay restitution ranging from $100,000 to just under $1
million. 77 Cox, who prepared the fraudulent financial
statements, was sentenced to only three years of probation,
with nine months of house arrest, and ordered to pay about
$90,000 in restitution. 7' The rest of the real estate
appraisers received sentences ranging from three years
probation with six months of house arrest, to nine months
imprisonment followed by three years of supervised
release. 79 The appraisers were ordered to pay restitution of
about $120,000 to $150,000 each. °
The details described here illustrate current prosecution
strategies and the relatively weak penalties they produce.
The Stalnaker case will be discussed again in Part III
through the prism of hypothetical RICO charges."
C. ProsecutionInadequacies
While it can be argued that the strategies used to
prosecute and punish mortgage fraud thus far have been
adequate, perhaps they have not been the best possible
solution. Inherent weaknesses in current prosecution
strategies include the fact that they do not directly address
the crime being committed; they cover a complex,
unfamiliar, and relatively new area of law; and perhaps
most importantly, the relatively weak penalties they impose

75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. See infra Part III.D.
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are not effectively deterring perpetrators from committing
mortgage fraud in the future.
It has already been addressed that there is currently no
specific mortgage fraud statute.82 Instead, a myriad of
white-collar statutes have become the standard for
prosecuting mortgage fraud.83 When making charging
decisions, "prosecutors don't have an easy task in front of
them."84 Not only are prosecutors left to choose among the
multitude of applicable statutes out there, they are also left
with the task of understanding the transactions that
occurred in order to apportion blame and prove intent to
defraud among the multiple perpetrators that may be
involved in a single complex case.
"The complexity inherent in investigating mortgage
fraud, combined with the sheer size of the problem and
federal resource constraints, makes difficult effective
prosecution of criminal behavior in the industry."86 It is not
just that mortgage fraud cases are complex. More than that,
mortgage fraud represents a specialized area of the law that
many law enforcement officers and prosecutors are not yet
familiar with or well trained in.87 As a result, the recent
influx of mortgage fraud cases is causing a strain on law
enforcement resources. 8 The government is being forced to
frugally allocate their resources, such as time and money,
by g9ng after only the most egregious mortgage fraud
cases.8
82. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
83. See supra pp. 307-10.
84. Emil J. Bove III, Institutional Factors Bearing on Criminal Charging
Decisions in Complex Regulatory Environments, 45 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1347, 1356
(2008) (quoting Aaron Lucchetti & Paul Davies, NYSE Specialists' Image May
Take a Beating, WALL ST. J., June 13, 2006, at Cl) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
85. See Ceresney et al., supra note 2, at 235.
86. Id.
87. See Michael Braga et al., Flipping Fraud Ignored by Police and
Prosecutors,SARASOTA HERALD-TRIB., July 22, 2009, at 1A.
88. See id.
89. See id.; see also OFFICE OF STATEWIDE INTELLIGENCE, FLORIDA DEP'T OF
LAW ENFORCEMENT, MORTGAGE FRAUD ASSESSMENT 5-6 (2005) [hereinafter FDLE

Mortgage Fraud Assessment], available at http://www.heraldtribune.com
assets/pdf/SH17330717.PDF ("Due to the lack of resources, state and federal
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Perhaps the largest weakness of the current mortgage
fraud prosecution strategies is their lack of deterrence
towards offenders. Mortgage fraud is seen as a "criminal
activity which is relatively low-risk with high-yield
returns."9 "You get no deterrence and it's free money," notes
and economics
Bill Black, a white-collar crime expert
9
professor at the University of Missouri. I
When broadly discussing white-collar versus blue-collar
crimes, there is "little evidence" that defendants convicted
of white-collar crimes are less likely to recidivate.92 A study
done by the United States Sentencing Commission93 notes
that .'[e]ven though fraud . . . offenders have lower
recidivism rates' for first time offenders, for offenders with a
criminal history, 'the recidivism rates of these offenses
exceeds 50[%],' which is comparable to the recidivism rates
for robbery and firearm offenders." The civil penalties and
criminal sanctions being issued in response to fraud and
other white-collar crimes simply do not act to deter
offenders .
Mortgage fraud offenders, in particular, have
frequently shown very little remorse for their actions. Many
offenders still argue, even after conviction, that "they did
nothing wrong;,'96 "[I]n their minds, a dollar borrowed was a
dollar earned."97 For example, Wilbert Brodie, a recent
mortgage fraud defendant, was convicted on charges of
conspiracy, wire fraud, and false statements for his
agencies tend to initiate investigations in which there is a social, economic,
regulatory or political impact.... Taxpaying constituents often find themselves
'shopping' for a police agency and a prosecutor to take their case.").
90. 2008 Mortgage FraudReport, supranote 4.
91. Braga et al., supranote 87, at 7A.
92. Andrew Weissman & Joshua A. Block, White-Collar Defendants and
White-Collar Crimes, 116 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 286, 290 (2007).

93. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, MEASURING RECIDMISM: THE CRIMINAL HISTORY
available at

COMPUTATION OF THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES (2004),

http://www.ussc.gov/publicat/recidivism-general.pdf.
94. Weissman & Block, supra note 92, at 290 (quoting U.S. SENTENCING
COMM'N, supra note 93).
95. Id. at 290.
96. Michael Braga et al., The King of the SarasotaFlip, SARASOTA HERALDTRIB., July 21, 2009, at 1A.
97. Id. at 7A.
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involvement in a mortgage fraud scheme to flip houses.98 In
the government's Memorandum in Aid of Sentencing, the
government stressed that "the defendant's recidivism,
spanning over eighteen months, reflects a callous
indifference to the social effects of his scheme."99
In another recent case, Chalana McFarland, a closing
attorney in Georgia, was disbarred as a result of her
participation in a mortgage fraud scheme.' °0 After being
disbarred, McFarland moved to Florida where she
continued to set up fraudulent purchases through straw
buyers.'0 ' McFarland was eventually convicted on a 170count indictment, including charges of conspiracy, bank
fraud, wire fraud, mail fraud, identity theft, and money
laundering, for her involvement in a mortgage fraud ring
that flipped more than 100 houses.' She was sentenced to
thirty years in federal prison and to pay nearly $12 million
in restitution.' 3 This sentence is believed to be the longest
and most severe sentence ever handed down in the United
States for a mortgage fraud case." During the sentencing
hearing, the judge cited McFarland's lack of remorse as one
of the factors contributing to the severity of the sentence. 105
Unless some new government action is taken, "the
attraction for mortgage fraud is likely to continue given the
relative ease of committing these frauds, the light penalties
in most state criminal systems, and the limits on law
enforcement resources in prosecuting these schemes."'0 6
98. United States v. Brodie, 326 F. Supp. 2d 83, 86 (D.D.C. 2004);
Government's Memorandum in Aid of Sentencing, United States v. Brodie, 326
F. Supp. 2d 83 (D.D.C. 2004) (No. 02-190) [hereinafter Sentencing
Memorandum].
99. Sentencing Memorandum, supranote 98, at 13.
100. Weissman & Block, supranote 92, at 290-91.
101. Id.
102. Ann Fulmer, Chalana McFarland Sentenced to 30 Years in Prison,
FRAUD BLOG (Aug. 25, 2005, 7:59 AM), http://www.mortgage
fraudbloghttp://www.mortgagefraudblog.com/index.php/weblog/permalink/georgi
a_hands-downjlongest-mortgage-fraudsentence.
MORTGAGE

103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Pierson, supra note 21, at 14.
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D. Possibilitiesfor Change
Perhaps the most logical fix to this problem would be to
create a statute that directly addresses mortgage fraud,
complete with strict penalties to assure deterrence.
However, since laws cannot be created and used to
prosecute crimes ex post facto, °7 this option will not be
discussed.' 8°
If we cannot create new laws to prosecute current
crimes, perhaps we can invest the resources to train
investigators and prosecutors in this complex area of law.
The influx of recent mortgage fraud cases has already put a
strain on government resources though; investigators and
prosecutors are already being stretched much too thin."9 If
we cannot create new laws to prosecute these cases, and we
cannot take the time or money to educate investigators and
prosecutors on the complexities of mortgage fraud and the
multitude of related statutes, what can we do?
The only feasible answer seems to be to focus in on
what investigators and prosecutors already know-to find
an area of the law they are already familiar with which can
simultaneously be adapted to prosecute mortgage fraud
perpetrators. Not only must it be a familiar and well-used
area of the law, it must also contain strict penalties in order
to perform a strong deterrent effect. Enter: RICO.
III. MORTGAGE FRAUD AS RACKETEERING
A. RICO Elements and Definitions
The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act ("RICO") is more formally known as Title IX of the
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970."0 RICO § 901(a)
provides that it is (i):
107. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 ("No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law
shall be passed.").
108. It should be noted, however, that the creation of a separate federal
mortgage fraud statute for use in prosecuting future crimes is an issue that
merits both legal and legislative debate.
109. See supraPart II.C.
110. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (2006).
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unlawful for any person who has received any income derived,
directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity ...to
use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of such income, or the
proceeds of such income, in acquisition of any interest in or the
establishment or operation of, any enterprise which is engaged11in,
1
or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce.

RICO also prohibits any person from (ii) acquiring or
maintaining "through a pattern of racketeering activity or
through collection of an unlawful debt ...any interest in or
control of any enterprise which is engaged in, or the
activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce";112
(iii) conducting or participating "in the conduct of such an
enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering
activity or collection of unlawful debt"; 13 and (iv) conspiring
to participate in any of the abovementioned activities.'
In order to prosecute a defendant under RICO, the
government must prove three elements: "the defendant: (i)
through the commission of two or more acts constituting a
pattern of racketeering activity; (ii) directly or indirectly
invested in, maintained an interest in, or participated in, an
enterprise; (iii) [which was engaged in, or] the activities of
which affected interstate or foreign commerce."' 5
RICO itself contains no specified statute of limitations.
Instead, the Supreme Court has stepped in and set the
statute of limitations for criminal RICO prosecutions at five
years-an amount of time equal to the default statute of
limitations set by Congress.' The predicate acts of a RICO
violation, however, can occur up to ten years apart. 7 A
111. § 1962(a).
112. § 1962(b).
113. § 1962(c).
114. § 1962(d).

115. Michael W. Holt & Kevin M. Davis, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations,46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 975, 978 (2009); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1962.
116. Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., 483 U.S. 143, 155-56
(1987) ("RICO itself includes no express statute of limitations for either civil or
criminal remedies, and the 5-year statute of limitations applies to criminal
RICO prosecutions only because Congress has provided such a criminal
limitations period when no other period is specified."). In this case, the Supreme
Court also set the statute of limitations for civil RICO violations at four years.
Id. at 156.
117. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (2006); see also infra Part III.A.1.
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violation of RICO is punishable by a fine, a maximum of
twenty years imprisonment or both, and asset forfeiture
may also attach. " ' The implications of these penalties are
discussed below in Part III.B.
1. A Pattern of Racketeering Activity. The statutory
definition of "racketeering activity" is very broad,
encompassing a wide range of predicate offenses including
murder,
kidnapping,
arson,
bribery,
extortion,
embezzlement, securities fraud, immigration crimes, and
more.'19 Specific to mortgage fraud activities, the relevant
predicate offenses for "racketeering activity" include "any
act which is indictable under any of the following provisions
of title 18, United States Code: . . .section 1341 (relating to
mail fraud), section 1343 (relating to wire fraud), section
1344 (relating to financial institution fraud) . . . [and]
section 1956 (relating to the laundering of monetary
instruments). '' 120
It is important to note that RICO defendants do not
have to be convicted of each underlying predicate offense
before RICO can be charged.' 2' If a defendant has been
acquitted of criminal charges for a relevant act, it may still
serve as a predicate act of a RICO offense. 2 2 If the predicate
act is based on charges for which the defendant was
acquitted in another case, however, then the jury must find
the predicate act proved in the RICO case to support a
RICO conviction.

118. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (2006).
119. § 1961(1).
120. Id.
121. Holt & Davis, supra note 115, at 979; see also Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex
Co., 473 U.S. 479, 493 (1985) ("There is no requirement that a private action
under § 1964(c) can proceed only against a defendant who has already been
convicted of a predicate act or of a RICO violation. A prior-conviction
requirement is not supported by RICO's history, its language, or considerations
of policy. To the contrary, every indication is that no such requirement exists.");
BancOklahoma Mortgage Corp. v. Capital Title Co., 194 F.3d 1089, 1102 (10th
Cir. 1999) ("[A] person does not have to be formally convicted of any predicate
act before liability under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) may attach.").
122. Holt & Davis, supra note 115, at 979. Note that Congress has prohibited
the use of unconvicted securities fraud as a predicate offense under RICO. Id. at
981.
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A 'pattern of racketeering activity' requires at least two
acts of racketeering activity, one of which occurred after the
effective date of this [statute] and the last of which occurred
within ten years (excluding any period of imprisonment)
after the commission of a prior act of racketeering
' Since RICO is not aimed at isolated offenders or
activity." 23
incidents though, "proof of two acts of racketeering activity,
'
without more, does not establish a pattern."24
Instead, a
prosecutor must show that 2' 5the predicate acts are
"continuous and interrelated."
"It is this factor of
continuity plus relationship which combines to produce a
pattern." This has become known as the "continuity-plus
relationship-test," under which the government must
establish not only a relationship between two or more
27
predicate acts, but also continuity of those acts over time. 1
To determine what constitutes a relationship, the
Supreme Court has turned to Congress' definition of a
pattern requirement in Title X of the Organized Crime
Control Act.1 28 Thus, "criminal conduct forms a pattern if it
embraces criminal acts that have the same or similar
purposes, results, participants, victims, or methods of
commission, or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing
characteristics and are not isolated events. 1 2 ' The Supreme
Court has defined two different types of continuity: closedended continuity and open-ended continuity.'3 ° Close-ended
continuity is demonstrated "by proving a series of related

123. § 1961(5).
124. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 496 n.14 (quoting 116 CONG. REC. 18940 (1970)
(statement of Sen. McClellan)).
125. Holt & Davis, supranote 115, at 981.
126. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 496 n.14 (quoting S. Rep. No. 91-617, p. 1 5 8 (1969))
(emphasis added in Sedima).
127. See H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 492 U.S. 229, 239
(1989) ("RICO's legislative history reveals Congress' intent that to prove a
pattern of racketeering activity a plaintiff or prosecutor must show that the
racketeering predicates are related, and that they amount to or pose a threat of
continued criminal activity."); Holt & Davis, supra note 115, at 982.
128. H.J.Inc., 492 U.S. at 240.
129. Id. (quoting Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. 91-452, 84
Stat. 922 (18 U.S.C. § 3575(e)).
130. Id. at 241.

312

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59

predicates extending over a substantial period of time."13
Open-ended continuity is demonstrated by showing that
even though the activity lasted only a short period
of time,
2
it poses a threat of extending into the future.
2. An Enterprise.The next step in prosecuting a RICO
case is to show that the defendant "directly or indirectly
invested in, maintained an interest in, or participated in, an
'
enterprise." 33
An 'enterprise' includes any individual,
partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity,
and any union or group of individuals associated in fact
although not a legal entity."'34 This definition is
purposefully broad in order to encompass a wide variety of
criminal associations. Several courts have validated the
vague definition as being necessary based on the "shifting"
and "fluid nature" of criminal associations. 35
Two broad categories of enterprises have emerged in
RICO cases: legal entities and associations-in-fact. Legal
entities include both public and private entities and have
been found to encompass such organizations as private
businesses, sole proprietorships, corporations, labor
organizations, and schools.'36 The relationships among
members of a RICO enterprise do not need to be formalized
though. Informal relationships among members are
37
sufficient to demonstrate an associated-in-fact enterprise.
"In order to be an association-in-fact, the3 groups must have
a shared purpose, continuity, and unity."'

131. Id. at 241-42.
132. Id.
133. See suprapp. 308-09 (describing the three main elements of a RICO case).
134. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (2006).
135. See, e.g., United States v. Swiderski, 593 F.2d 1246, 1249 (D.C. Cir. 1978)
('The shifting definition of 'enterprise' was validated by the courts cited above
as necessary in view of the fluid nature of criminal associations.").
136. Holt & Davis, supra note 115, at 986-87.
137. Id. at 987.
138. Id.; see also Boyle v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 2237, 2240 (2009) (holding
that proof of an association-in-fact enterprise under RICO requires three
"features": (1) purpose; (2) relationships among those associated with the
enterprise (unity); and (3) sufficient longevity for the associates to pursue the
enterprise's purpose (continuity)).
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If the enterprise is a legal entity, "the enterprise
element is satisfied by the mere proof of the entity's legal
' Otherwise, in order to show that an enterprise
existence."139
is an association-in-fact, the government must show "a
group of persons associated together for a common purpose
of engaging in a course of conduct." 4 ' Although there may
be some overlap between the proof used to establish a
pattern of racketeering and an enterprise, these are distinct
elements that must exist "separate and apart" from one
another.141 "While the proof used to establish these separate
elements may in particular cases coalesce, proof of one does
not necessarily establish the other." '
It is important to note that a RICO defendant does not
need to have a stake in the operation of the enterprise.4 It
is sufficient that the defendant is "an individual outside of
the enterprise who assists the enterprise in attaining its
goals."1 The Supreme Court has recognized that "RICO
liability is not limited to those with primary responsibility
139. Holt & Davis, supra note 115, at 988.
140. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583 (1981).
141. Id. But see State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Cohan, No. CV-09-2990 (JS)
(WDW), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125653, at *19-22 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 30, 2009)
(noting that the Supreme Court's decision in Boyle seems have "loosened the
requirement" that the pattern of racketeering activity and the enterprise must
be distinct from one another).
142. Id. Some courts have held that the enterprise might need to be something
more than just a collection of racketeering acts. See, e.g., United States v.
Rogers, 89 F.3d 1326, 1337 (7th Cir. 1996) ("As a separate element, 'enterprise'
still requires more than a 'pattern of racketeering activity' . . . the fact that a
single individual may engage in a pattern of racketeering activity without, of
course, comprising an enterprise adequately illustrates the inherent and logical
distinction between these two elements.").
143. Holt & Davis, supra note 115, at 985.
144. Id. at 985 & n.76; see also Blue Cross & Blue Shield of N.J., Inc. v. Philip
Morris, Inc., 113 F. Supp. 2d 345, 366 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) ("A defendant is
considered to have 'associated with' a RICO enterprise if he engages in the
predicate act violations with other members of the enterprise, even if he is not
an actual 'insider' of the enterprise."). But cf. Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S.
170, 185 (1993) ("[("[Section] 1962(c) cannot be interpreted to reach complete
'outsiders' because liability depends on showing that the defendants conducted
or participated in the conduct of the 'enterprise's affairs,' not just their own
affairs. Of course, 'outsiders' may be liable under § 1962(c) if they are 'associated
with' an enterprise and participate in the conduct of its affairs-that is,
participate in the operation or management of the enterprise itself .... ").
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for the enterprise's affairs" and "is not limited to those with
' However, in 1993, the
a formal position in the enterprise."145
Supreme Court held that for a defendant to be found civilly
liable under § 1962(c) for "conduct[ing]" or "participat[ing]"
in an enterprise, a defendant must pass the "operation or
management test."'46 The defendant does not need to be in
upper management of the enterprise to pass this test;
liability can extend to lower level employees who act under
the direction of upper management, to persons associated
with the enterprise who exert control over it, and to
outsiders who participate in the enterprise through its
operation
or
management.'47
The
"operation
or
management" test has since been applied to criminal RICO
charges under § 1962(c) as well.'48
Finally, the Eleventh Circuit recently held that an
entity can be both an enterprise under RICO and a victim of
the racketeering activity.149 This is an important
development, as it reflects the reality that the enterprise
itself is often a passive instrument of corruption.15 °
3. Engaged In or Affecting Interstate Commerce. The
final element the government must prove is that the
activities charged involved or affected interstate or foreign
commerce.' 5 ' "Only a minimal impact upon interstate
commerce is necessary to support a RICO conviction."''
145. Reves, 507 U.S. at 179.
146. Id.
147. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (THIRD) § 33.82 (1995) (citing Reves).
148. See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 605 F.3d 985, 1018-19 (D.C. Cir. 2010)
(revisiting the district court's jury instructions that the defendant could be
criminally liable for participating in the conduct of the enterprise even if he was
a 'lower rung" participant in the enterprise if one or more of the defendants
managed or operated the enterprise). Wilson also stands for the premise that
the operation or management test applies only to subsection (c) of § 1962 and
not to other RICO violations, such as RICO conspiracy under § 1962(d). Id. at
1019-20.
149. United States v. Browne, 505 F.3d 1229, 1273-74 (11th Cir. 2007)
(holding that union members, whose organization met the definition of an
enterprise that had been co-opted into a racket, were victims of racketeering).
150. See id.
151. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (2006).
152. United States v. Johnson, 440 F.3d 832, 841 (6th Cir. 2006).
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Technically, the enterprise itself and not the predicate acts
1 53
must be engaged in or affect interstate commerce.
However, courts have held that while "[t]he interstate
commerce nexus must result from the enterprise[, i]t is
permissible to find that nexus from acts also charged as
predicate acts when those constitute the activities of the
enterprise."'54 Simply stated, "the interstate nature of the
predicate acts themselves can establish the required
and interstate
connection between the enterprise
5
5
only prove that
need
Thus,
the
government
commerce."'
minimis impact
the racketeering activities charged had 51 de
6
on or connection to interstate commerce.
4. Conspiracy. RICO also prohibits "any person" from
conspiring to violate any provision of § 1962 (i.e., from
conspiring to participate in any of the above-mentioned
activities).'57 This allows the government to prosecute
individuals who have not committed or been convicted of
any of the underlying predicate offenses. 158 To convict a
defendant of conspiracy, the government must prove only
that the defendant "intend[ed] to further an endeavor
which, if completed, would satisfy all of the elements of a
substantive criminal offense."'59 As long as "partners in the
criminal plan [ ] agree to pursue the same criminal
objective,"'' 6' not all participants in the enterprise must
"agree to commit or facilitate each and every part of the
substantive offense.''

153. Id.
154. Id. (quoting United States v. Bagnariol, 665 F.2d 877, 893 (9th Cir. 1981))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
155. Id. at 841.
156. Id. (quoting United States v. Qaoud, 777 F.2d 1105, 1116 (6th Cir. 1985)).
157. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (2006).
158. See Holt & Davis, supranote 115, at 997.
159. Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 65 (1997).
160. Id. at 63.
161. Holt & Davis, supra note 115, at 997.
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B. The Strategic Value of RICO
RICO is a commonly used statute among prosecutors. In
2004, the most recent year for which the Bureau of Justice
Statistics has issued a comprehensive federal report, there
were 3,644 defendants charged with racketeering and
extortion.'62 This is close to 150% of the number of mortgage
fraud investigations pending by the FBI in 2009 and over
350% of the number of new mortgage fraud cases opened in
the first four months of 2009.163
Another of RICO's strengths is the harsh penalties it
imposes, along with its stigma. The U.S. Attorneys' Manual
notes that it is appropriate to use RICO where "RICO is
necessary to ensure that the indictment adequately reflects
the nature and extent of the criminal conduct involved in a
way that prosecution only on the underlying charges would
not," and where "[a] RICO prosecution would provide the
basis for an appropriate sentence under all the
circumstancesof the case in a way that prosecution only on
the underlying charges would not."'"
As noted above, each RICO violation is punishable by a
fine, imprisonment, or both, as well as asset forfeiture.'65
The maximum fine for a RICO charge is "twice the gross
profits or other proceeds" from the crime.'66 Those amounts
may far outweigh the million dollar cap set on most bank,
wire, and mail fraud statutes. For example, if a mortgage
fraud scheme netted $5 million in profits, a single RICO
charge could punish the offender with a $10 million fine, as
opposed to an indictment charging bank, wire, and mail
fraud, at $1 million each for an aggregate fine of only $3

162. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, COMPENDIUM OF FED. JUSTICE STATISTICS,

2004 32 (Dec. 2006).
163. See supranote 15.
164. CRIMINAL DIv., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATORNEYS' MANUAL

§ 9-110.310 (1997) (emphasis added). These are only the first two uses detailed
in the manual. The manual also notes that it is appropriate to use RICO in
situations where the combination of related offenses would otherwise be
prosecuted in separate jurisdictions, and where there is a compelling federal
government interest to intervene with violations of state law. Id.
165. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (2006); see also supra pp. 309-10.
166. § 1963(a)(3).
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million (which would still leave the offender with $2 million
in illegal profits).
The maximum length of imprisonment for a RICO
charge is twenty years.67 While this is ten years less than
the thirty year maximum for bank, wire, or mail fraud, it is
important to keep in mind that maximum sentences are
often not incurred by offenders. A better indicator of
incarceration penalties is to look at the average length of
imprisonment for each offense. The Bureau of Justice
Statistics states that the average length of imprisonment
for any federal offense is 59.7 months."' The average length
of imprisonment for fraud, classified in the Compendium of
Federal Justice Statistics as the most common form of
actionable property offense, is 27.4 months.169 The average
length of imprisonment for racketeering, classified as the
most common public-order offense, is 43.6 months. 70 Thus,
even though the maximum length of imprisonment for
RICO charges is not as high as for fraud charges,
defendants convicted of RICO offenses are likely to receive
longer sentences than those convicted of fraud offenses.
Not only does RICO offer higher fines and longer prison
sentences, it also allows for asset forfeiture. 7 ' RICO states:
Whoever violates any provision of section 1962... shall forfeit to
the United States, irrespective of any provision of state law . ..
any interest the person has acquired or maintained in violation of
section 1962 ...[including] any property constituting, or derived
from, any proceeds which the person 72 obtained, directly or
indirectly, from racketeering activity ....1

What this means is that on top of fining offenders twice
their proceeds from a crime, the government may also step
167. § 1963(a).
168. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supranote 162, at 2.

169.
170.
171.
172.

Id. at 2, 32.
Id.
18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(1)-(3).
Id.; see also James Lieber, What Cooked the World's Economy? It Wasn't
Your Overdue Mortgage, THE VILLAGE VOICE, Jan. 28, 2009, at 18,
http://www.villagevoice.com/2009-1-28/news/what-cooked-the-world-s-economy
('The advantage of treating these players like racketeers under federal law is
that their ill-gotten gains could be forfeited. The government could recoup these
odious.., debts instead of simply paying them off.").
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in and seize title assets such as properties or homes that
have been obtained as a result of the crime, as well as
property such as automobiles, boats, artwork, electronics,
etc. that have been purchased with proceeds from the
crime."'
Furthermore, RICO allows the government to place pretrial restraints on such assets. 75' "The possibility of pre-trial
restraints on assets is clearly one of the most powerful tools
for a prosecutor under RICO" '76 as it "guarantee[s] the
payment of later judgments .

.

. where a defendant might

otherwise begin to dispose of them or transfer them to
conceal them from the government. 77 This is an important
prosecutorial tool that statutes addressing mail, wire, and
bank fraud do not currently offer.
Lastly, RICO charges bring with them a certain stigma.
RICO charges are often used when prosecutors want to
"aggressively" go after a case and "elevate" the charges to a
stronger level of prosecution.'78 It has been noted that even
the threat of a RICO indictment may be more likely [than
other charges, such as fraud] to cause defendants to settle
their case. 9 "To me it ups the ante," says FBI Special Agent
Keith Slotter. "It shows how seriously we take the crime....
It's the most serious charge you could go with."'8 °

174. See Treasury Auctions, DEP'T
auctions/ (last visited Jan. 21, 2010).

OF THE TREASURY,

http://www.ustreas.gov/

175. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(d) (2006).
176. L. Gordon Crovitz, How the RICO Monster Mauled Wall Street, 65 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1050, 1060 (1990).
177. Id.
178. See id. at 1058.
179. Id. at 1064 ('This was the $650 million question for the Board of Directors
of Drexel Burham Lambert, which decided that this amount in settlement of all
the charges was a fair price to pay to avoid being RICOed.").
180. Kelly Bennett, Mafia-Esque Charges Brought Against Alleged Mortgage
VOICE OF SAN
DIEGO (Apr. 7, 2009), available at
http://www.voiceofsandiego.org/housing/article-65781e99-4aa9-558b-abcl8b2916c67025.html.

Fraud Ring,

20111

RICO AND MORTGAGE FRAUD

319

C. The LegislativePurposeof RICO and Its Relationship to
Mortgage Fraud
Although RICO was originally enacted to combat
organized crime,"' "by the mid-1980s, many criminal RICO
cases were aimed at a new breed of alleged criminals that
had no ties to organized crime." ' Robert Blakey, a Notre
Dame Law School professor who was an aide to Senator
McClellan during the drafting of RICO, has defended the
broad use of RICO:
Read the language [of RICO]. The language says 'any person.'
There's nothing about any person who happens to be a member of
the mob, or any persona whose name ends in a vowel. It says any
person. Stop and think about it for a minute. It would be obscene
if it were otherwise. The statute doesn't apply to blue-collar
people
83
only, or no-collar people only. It applies to everybody.

In a 1970 Congressional Hearing advocating the
passage of RICO, Congress found that "organized crime
activities in the United States weaken the stability of the
Nation's economic system, harm innocent investors and
competing organizations, interfere with free competition,
seriously burden interstate and foreign commerce, threaten
the domestic security, and undermine the general welfare of
the Nations and its citizens."'84 Analyzing the mortgage
fraud problem post-2007, this original legislative rationale
seems eerily close to what experts now have to say about
the after affects of the sub-prime crisis.' 5
Using RICO to prosecute mortgage fraud is not a radical
idea. RICO statutes are being used more and more

181. Crovitz, supranote 176, at 1051.
182. Id.

183. Id. at 1067-68 (quoting G. Robert Blakey, Nightline: The RICO Act (ABC
News Apr. 12, 1989)); see also id. at 1067 ("[T]he rigorous penalties of RICO are
just as applicable against an investment banker or accountant as against the
head of a Mafia family that runs drugs and commits murder.").
184. Id. at 1052 (quoting 116 CONG. REC. 575-76 (1970)).
185. See, e.g., Press Release, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, supra note 20
('Mortgage fraud and related securities fraud pose a significant threat to our
economy, to the stability of our nation's housing market and to the peace of
mind of millions of American homeowners.").
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frequently in a "non-traditional" sense.' 6 Recently, RICO
has been used as the basis of claims in a wide range of
cases, addressing issues such as anti-abortion protests,
tobacco litigation, police misconduct, and health care
fraud.8 7
The reason RICO fits so well with mortgage fraud is
that its core elements align almost perfectly with the very
definition of mortgage fraud. It has been noted that
mortgage fraud "often involves multiple conspirators acting
in concert," ' and that although "one may commit mortgage
fraud by a single act, mortgage fraud usually involves a
combination of bad acts."'89 "Multiple conspirators acting in
concert" easily translates into an association-in-fact
enterprise.190 "A combination of bad acts" turns into a
pattern of racketeering. 9 ' In terms of conspiracy, about
eighty percent of all reported mortgage fraud losses involve
collaboration or collusion by industry insiders. 92 Collusion,
similar to conspiracy, "involves two or more individuals
working in unison to implement a fraud."'93 If we are
looking for an area of familiar law with harsher penalties
that supports the modern and complex crime of mortgage
fraud, RICO seems like a natural fit.
D. A Case Study: United States v. Stalnaker Through the
Prism of RICO
94
Let us return to the case of United States v. Stalnaker
In order to better illustrate the prosecution and sentencing
186. Holt & Davis, supranote 115, at 1021-26.
187. Id. Some of these cases involved the use of civil RICO rather than
criminal RICO. Note that the burden of proof in a civil RICO action is less than
the burden in a criminal RICO action. The civil burden of proof is
preponderance of the evidence, while the criminal burden of proof is beyond a
reasonable doubt. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 147, § 33.86.
188. Pierson, supranote 21, at 15; see also supra Part I.B.
189. Jacobson & Barnhill, supra note 28, at 9; see also supraPart I.B.
190. Pierson, supra note 21, at 15.
191. Jacobson & Barnhill, supra note 28, at 9.
192. FDLE Mortgage Fraud Assessment, supranote 89, at 8.
193. FFIEC White Paper, supranote 9, at 9.
194. 571 F.3d 428 (5th Cir. 2009).
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of a mortgage fraud case under RICO, we will explore
Stalnaker as if its defendants had been charged with RICO
violations. 95'
Instead of being charged with bank fraud, wire fraud,
conspiracy to commit bank fraud, conspiracy to commit wire
fraud, and conspiracy to commit money laundering, as the
' in a RICO
defendants in the actual Stalnaker case were, 96
case, these charges would merely act as the predicate
offenses.'97 Under RICO, the Stalnaker defendants would
have been charged with (i) conducting or participating in an
enterprise engaged in or affecting interstate commerce
through a pattern of racketeering activity; (ii) acquiring or
maintaining an interest in an enterprise engaged in or
affecting interstate commerce through a pattern of
racketeering activity; and (iii) using or investing income
derived from a pattern of racketeering activity to establish
the operation of an enterprise whose activities involved or
' In order to meet the burden
affected interstate commerce. 98
of proof for these offenses, a prosecutor would have argued
the following: (i) the defendants' actions constituted a
pattern of racketeering activity; (ii) the defendants
participated in an enterprise; and (iii) these actions involved
or affected interstate commerce.

195. See supra Part II.B.
196. Indictment Press Release, supranote 62.
197. However, charging RICO or a RICO conspiracy, or both, does not preclude
the government from also prosecuting substantive mail, wire, or bank fraud
violations. See ORG. CRIME & RACKETEERING SECTION, CRIMINAL DIV., U.S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL RICO: 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968, A MANUAL FOR FEDERAL
PROSECUTORS
359 (5th ed. 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/
usao/eousa/foiajreading-roomusamtitle9/rico.pdf ("RICO was designed to
augment existing civil and criminal remedies, and therefore, RICO, as a general
rule is not pre-empted by other, even more specific statutes."); see also ORG.
CRIME & RACKETEERING SECTION, CRIMINAL DIV., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL

RICO: 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968, A MANUAL FOR FEDERAL ATTORNEYS 273 (2007),
available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/foiadocs/2007civil-rico.pdf ("The
legislative history to RICO likewise firmly establishes that Congress adopted
the civil and criminal remedies of RICO to add to, not subtract from, existing
remedies."). But as the purpose of this Comment is to point out the
shortcomings of these statutes and to focus on the strength of RICO charges
instead, the charging of separate violations in the hypothetical version of the
Stalnakercase will not be discussed.
198. See supra pp. 308-09.
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1. A Pattern of Racketeering Activity. As mentioned
above, the original charges in this case would provide the
predicate offenses for a RICO violation. Racketeering
activity is established with a showing of the predicate
offenses of wire fraud, bank fraud, and money laundering.'99
Since the commission of these predicate offenses was
already proven in the original Stalnaker case, we will not
explore them further."' Once it has been shown that two or
more predicate offenses were committed, the next step is to
demonstrate a pattern of racketeering activity through the
continuity-plus-relationship test."'
"[C]riminal conduct forms a pattern if it embraces
criminal acts that have the same or similar purposes,
results participants, victims, or methods of commission
.
. "02 In Stalnaker, the defendants worked together in
order to commit mortgage fraud.0 3 They had a common
purpose of submitting fraudulent loan applications for
fraudulently appraised properties in order to secure
illegitimate proceeds. 2" The same twelve defendants helped
perpetuate this scheme multiple times; at least five
separate properties were flipped over a span of five
months.0 5
Each time, the scheme was committed with similar
methods. Lucas would recruit straw buyers; the straw
buyers would submit fraudulent paperwork prepared by
Cox; Stalnaker and others would fraudulently appraise the
properties; and finally, Castle would close on the properties
and release the loan proceeds. 0 6 The government's
Responsive Brief notes that "Lucas would name the price

199. 18 U.S.C. §1961(1) (2006).
200. See Responsive Brief of United States at 8-25, United States v. Stalnaker,
571 F.3d 428 (5th Cir. 2009) (No. 07-60247) [hereinafter Responsive Brief].
201. See supra p. 311.
202. 18 U.S.C. § 3575(e) (1970).
203. See 571 F.3d at 428.
204. See id.
205. Responsive Brief, supra note 200, at 21-22.
206. See Indictment Press Release, supra note 62; Sentencing Press Release,
supranote 62.
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2 °7 Also,
that he needed and Stalnaker regularly delivered."
the trial court found that "this was a malicious intentional
chain of events."2°' A pattern was established here by the
defendants and recognized by the trial court, thus, the
relationship prong was met.
The defendants demonstrated close-ended continuity by
committing "a series of related predicate [acts] extending
2 9 As noted above, the
over a substantial period of time.""
Stalnaker defendants flipped at least five separate
properties over a span of five months." ' This was not a
single, isolated act by the defendants, but rather a
continuous plan to defraud. Open-ended continuity was also
present in the Stalnaker case. If the defendants had not
been caught, they would have continued their illegal
scheme. This assertion is supported by the government's
Responsive Brief, noting that Castle was charged with
possessing "the intent to promote the carrying on of a
2 ' Where
both forms of
specified unlawful activity.""
continuity are met, along with the relationship prong and
two or more predicate offenses, a pattern of racketeering
has been established.
2. An Enterprise.The defendants in the Stalnaker case
demonstrated an association-in-fact. Since each of the
defendants operated at a different point in the scheme, and
did not all work within the same company (e.g.,
Countrywide),2 2 there was no formal legal entity. However,
there was "a group of persons associated together for a
common purpose of engaging in a course of conduct,"2 '3 i.e.
207. Responsive Brief, supra note 200, at 20 (internal quotation marks
omitted) (emphasis added).

208. Id. at 63 (emphasis added).
209. H.J.Inc., 492 U.S. at 242.
210. Responsive Brief, supranote 200, at 21-22.
211. Id. at 19 (internal quotation marks omitted).
212. It was well established in the facts of this case that the closing attorney,
Kimberly Castle, worked as an agent of Countrywide Financial. Castle used
Countrywide as a platform for launching and processing the fraudulent loan
applications. See United States v. Stalnaker, 571 F.3d 428, 435-37 (5th Cir.
2009). The straw buyers and appraisers in the mortgage fraud scheme did not
have any known affiliation with Countrywide and operated independently of the
organization, but with Castle's full knowledge. Id.
213. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583 (1981).
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to commit mortgage fraud for profit. The Fifth Circuit
referenced the idea of an association-in-fact by noting that
Lucas "orchestrated an elaborate mortgage fraud operation"
and referring to its participants as "members of the
conspiracy."2" 4 The government referenced the associationin-fact in its Responsive Brief by referring to it as "Lucas's
organization."" 5 This was not a one-time event, but rather a
continuous "operation" or "organization" in which the
defendants coordinated their individual roles and created a
''scheme to defraud" Countrywide and collect the
illegitimate loan proceeds as profits.2" 6 Since the defendants
have demonstrated a common purpose, a unified
relationship, and continuity, an enterprise has been
demonstrated.
Recall that a RICO defendant does not need to have a
stake in the operation of the enterprise; it is sufficient that
the defendant is "an individual outside of the enterprise
who assists the enterprise in attaining its illegal goals. 21
This is an important rule of law when it comes to mortgage
fraud cases because individual participants of a scheme can
be held responsible for the actions of the enterprise, even if
they were not involved every step of the way. In the
Stalnaker case, the government noted that "Stalnaker need
not have known every aspect of the fraud, including Lucas's
use of a document counterfeiter or his recruitment
meetings, to be culpable for his part in the fraud." '
Participants who play only a minimal role, such as straw
buyers, can still be held responsible for the actions of the
enterprise. 219
3. EngagedIn or Affecting Interstate Commerce. "[T]he
interstate nature of the predicate acts themselves [here]
establish the required connection between the enterprise

214. Stalnaker, 571 F.3d at 432.
215. Responsive Brief, supra note 200, at 40.
216. See id. at 10.
217. Holt & Davis, supra note 115, at 985 & n.76; see also supra Part III.A.4.
218. Responsive Brief, supranote 200, at 23 (internal citations omitted).
219. But see supra notes 146-48 and accompanying text (discussing the
operation or management test for liability under § 1962(c)).

2011]

RICO AND MORTGAGE FRAUD

325

22 The predicate act of wire fraud
and interstate commerce.""
involves interstate commerce by its very statutory
definition: wire fraud is committed when a person or
persons,

having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to
defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or
fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, transmits or
causes to be transmitted by means of wire, radio, or television
communication in interstate or foreign commerce, any writings,
signs, signals, pictures, or sounds for the purpose of executing
such scheme or artifice ....221

In the Stalnaker case, Castle faxed fraudulent HUD-1 forms
to Countrywide and sent other fraudulent loan application
documents via wire communication. The enterprise thus
used "interstate wires to complete the mortgage
transactions .223
The underlying charges of bank fraud in this case are in
reference to the mortgage lenders who were defrauded by
the enterprise. "Both entities involved here-Countrywide
Home Loans, Inc., the principal operating subsidiary of
Countrywide Financial Corporation, and the Alliance
Funding mortgage subsidiary of Superior Bank, FSB-fall
within the scope of the bank fraud statute because of the
close association between the mortgage subsidiary and the
financial institution parent. 224 Countrywide's "very name
alone signals its status as a national lender. '225 Thus, a
successful scheme to defraud Countrywide in one state
could affect its financial ability to lend in other states as
well. The same goes for Superior Bank, which also serves a
multi-state constituency.226

220. United States v. Johnson, 440 F.3d 832, 841 (6th Cir. 2006) (citing United

States v. Bagnariol, 665 F.2d 877, 893 (9th Cir. 1981)).
221. 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2006) (emphasis added).
222. Responsive Brief, supranote 200, at 15-16.
223. Id. at 17.
224. Id. at 73.
225. Id. at 24.
226. See SUPERIOR
2010).

BANK,

http://www.superiorbank.com (last visited Nov. 27,
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Money laundering is linked to interstate commerce in a
similar way to wire fraud. "[Mioney is commonly paid over
long distances by means of wire transfer."22' 7 The enterprise
"used some of the profits from the sale to pay buyers for
their participation,"228 and reinvested the rest of "the
proceeds of earlier transactions to promote the ongoing
'
The specific movement of these funds is not
scheme."229
detailed in the court documents, but it can be reasonably
inferred that the funds were laundered through some sort of
which in turn involved interstate
wire transfers,
230
commerce.

4. Conspiracy. If any of the twelve defendants did not
fulfill the above-mentioned elements, they could still be
prosecuted under RICO's conspiracy provision. These
defendants would be charged with conspiring to participate
in a pattern of racketeering activity. A prosecutor would
then have to prove that the defendants "intend[ed] to
further an endeavor which, if completed, would satisfy all of
the elements of a substantive criminal offense. 23 1
This is especially important in Stalnaker, and is
applicable to mortgage fraud prosecutions in general, since
many participants in such schemes may not know the full
extent to which the enterprise is operating. Often,
participants such as straw buyers are involved in the
scheme on a very elementary level, and are unaware of the
additional frauds being perpetrated above them.232
The Stalnaker straw buyers "agree[d] to pursue the
same criminal objective" as the rest of the mortgage fraud
participants. 233 All twelve defendants participated in the
scheme in order to reap illegal profits. The fact that the
227. Responsive Brief, supra note 200, at 16 (quoting United States v. Mann,
493 F.3d 484, 493 (5th Cir. 2007)).
228. United States v. Stalnaker, 571 F.3d 428, 433 (5th Cir. 2009).
229. Indictment Press Release, supra note 62.
230. There are only general references to how the funds were laundered; no
specific transactions are cited. See generally Stalnaker, 571 F.3d 428;
Responsive Brief, supra note 200; Reply Brief of Appellee/Appellant Kimberly A.
Castle, Stalnaker,571 F.3d 428 No. 07-60079 (5th Cir. Dec. 28, 2007).
231. Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 65 (1997).
232. See generally2008 Mortgage FraudReport, supranote 4.
233. Salinas,522 U.S. at 63.
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straw buyers did not "agree to commit or facilitate each and
every part"234 of the scheme, or that they were not aware of
"each and every" detail, does not excuse them from criminal
liability. Under RICO's conspiracy provision, any defendant
who agreed to participate in the mortgage fraud scheme
could be found guilty of conspiracy."'
5. Sentencing. While the maximum length of
imprisonment for each RICO offense is twenty years, judges
are afforded broad discretion in determining sentences.236
This makes the length of sentences imposed under RICO
difficult to predict.
However, for the sake of making an academic
comparison of the Stalnaker case under RICO as compared
to traditional fraud prosecution strategies, the following
approximate sentences have been derived mathematically
by: (i) comparing a given defendant's actual sentence in the
case to the average fraud sentence reported by the Federal
Bureau of Justice Statistics, and (ii) applying that ratio to
the average racketeering sentence reported by the Federal
Bureau of Justice Statistics.237 Under such calculations,
Lucas's sentence for imprisonment would jump from 168
months (14 years) to 267.3 months (22.3 years). This
represents a 99.3 month (8.3 year) increase from Lucas's
original sentence. Castle's sentence for imprisonment would
jump from 48 months (4 years) to 76.4 months (6.4 years).
This represents a 28.4 month (2.4 year) increase from
Castle's original sentence. Stalnaker's sentence for
imprisonment would jump from 28 months (2.3 years) to
44.5 months (3.7 years). This represents a 16.5 month (1.4
year) increase from Stalnaker's original sentence. For a
234. Holt & Davis, supra note 115, at 997.
235. Remember that the operation or management test for liability is for §
1962(c) only and explicitly does not apply to RICO conspiracy charges. See
United States v. Wilson, 605 F.3d 985, 1019-20 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
236. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 233 (2005); U.S. SENTENCING
(2009); see also LISA M. SEGHETTI & ALISON M. SMITH,
RL 32766, FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES:
CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
BACKGROUND, LEGAL ANALYSIS, AND POLICY OPTIONS 9 (June 2007) ("Tlhe Court
affirmed the broad sentencing discretion . ..judges possess under Booker and
stated that they may impose non-guideline sentences by departing or applying
§ 3553(a).").
GUIDELINES MANUAL

237. See Compendium of Fed. Justice Statistics, supranote 162, at 2, 32.
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more detailed explanation of how comparable sentences
were calculated, as well as to see the rest of the converted
sentences under this method, see the table below.23
RICO also calls for fines of "twice the gross profits or
other proceeds" from the crime.239 In this case, the total loss
was estimated to be $1,450,388.240 Twice this amount is
$2,900,776, which represents the maximum amount each
defendant could be fined under RICO. Once again, it is
difficult to estimate the amount that a judge or jury would
impose on each defendant. Instead of trying to come up with
a formula to approximate the average fine of each defendant
under RICO, I will just note that the aggregate amount paid
by all twelve defendants in the original case was
$5,819,358.241 This is less than 20% of the maximum fines
that could be ordered under RICO.242
Also under RICO, the government would have been able
to seize any assets belonging to the enterprise. 243 This would
include any homes still owned by the defendants that had
not yet been flipped or resold at the time of the indictment,
any profits from the scheme, and any property purchased
with profits derived from the scheme. The government
would have been able to place a pre-trial restraint on such
assets back in February 2006 when the indictment was
238. Mathematical calculations for comparable sentences are as follows (in
months):
Defendant

Original
Prison
Sentence

Avg.
Fraud
Sentence

Original
Prison/Avg.
Fraud

Avg.
Racketeering
Sentence

*Comparable
Racketeering
Sentence

Comparable
- Original

Lucas

168

27.4

6.13x

43.6

267.3

99.3

Castle

48

27.4

1.75x

43.6

76.4

28.4

Stalnaker

28

27.4

1.02x

43.6

44.5

16.5

Champ

9

27.4

0.33x

43.6

14.4

5.4

Weary

19

27.4

0.69x

43.6

30.1

11.1

Fairley

7

27.4

0.26x

43.6

11.3

4.3

*Comparable Racketeering Sentence = (Original Prison/Avg. Fraud) x (Avg. Racketeering)
239. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(3) (2006).

240. United States v. Stalnaker, 571 F.3d 428, 441 (5th Cir. 2009).
241. See Sentencing Press Release, supra note 62.
242. This number was calculated by taking the maximum fine of $2,900,776
and multiplying it by each of the twelve defendants charged in the Stalnaker
case.
243. § 1963(a)(1)-(3).
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filed, and the assets would have remained frozen until the
case was resolved in February 2007. This would have
prevented the defendants from liquidating or disposing of
any of the proceeds they possessed in the year that lapsed
between the indictment and sentencing.2
Hopefully, this illustration has provided readers a more
comprehensive idea of how RICO can be used to prosecute
acts of large-scale mortgage fraud. Looking at the individual
elements that make up the charges, as well as the
individual facts of the Stalnaker case, it is easy to see RICO
as a natural fit to prosecute and deter large-scale mortgage
fraud violations.
CONCLUSION

I recognize that in practice, it is often easier to stick to
the status quo than to branch out and try new, nontraditional prosecution strategies. However, in light of the
role that mortgage fraud played in the recent financial
crisis, we need to reconsider the traditional prosecution
strategies that have been used in the past and are still
being used today. We must ask ourselves: have mortgage
fraud perpetrators been sentenced harshly enough for the
damage they caused? Are we deterring these perpetrators
from causing similar damage in the future? And are the
enforcement and prosecution mechanisms currently in place
ready to take on the influx of mortgage fraud cases likely in
the coming years?
Based on the arguments made in this Comment, the
answer is "no." We are not sentencing mortgage fraud
perpetrators harshly enough when compared to the damage
they have caused to our economy. These perpetrators have
not been sufficiently deterred from committing similar acts
of fraud in the future, and the current mechanisms in place
to combat mortgage fraud are insufficient to combat the
likely volume of cases in the coming years. 45

244. There is no mention in the case or the supporting briefs that the
defendants tried to liquidate assets after they had been indicted. I mention the
option of a pre-trial restraint on assets only to further illustrate the advantages
of RICO over traditional mortgage fraud prosecution strategies.
245. See supraParts I.A, II.C.
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Implementing the wide-scale changes suggested in this
Comment on a national level will not happen overnight.
Instead, I would suggest that the use of RICO to prosecute
large-scale mortgage fraud be implemented on a trial level
in five to ten of the top mortgage fraud states. These states
include Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia,
Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, New
York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Texas, Virginia, and the
District of Columbia.246
It is important to note that all RICO prosecutions by
U.S. attorneys must be approved by the Department of
Justice. 247 The Department of Justice issues Guidelines for
RICO Prosecutions that "set[ ] out rigid, national rules of
prosecutorial discretion. '' 24' The U.S. Attorneys' Manual
states that:
Despite the broad statutory language of RICO and the legislative
intent that the statute ". . . shall be liberally construed to
effectuate its remedial purpose" it is the policy of the Criminal
Division that RICO be selectively and uniformly used. It is the
purpose of these guidelines to make it clear that not every case in
which technically the elements of a RICO violation exist will
result in the approval of a RICO charge.249

Some readers may view this as a setback in the
proposed prosecution strategy. However, "[t]he use of RICO
in the 1980s by federal prosecutors, especially by former
U.S. Attorney for Manhattan, Rudolph Giuliani, against

alleged white-collar criminals ,"250 including wealthy oil
trader Marc Rich, investment banking firm Drexel
Burnham Lambert, and the now infamous Michael Milken,
has greatly extended RICO's reach.25 ' In fact, "there is
246. 2008 Mortgage FraudReport, supra note 4; JAMES ET AL., supra note 2, at
4.
247. Crovitz, supra note 176, at 1056; see also CRIMINAL RICO: A MANUAL FOR
FEDERAL PROSECUTORS, supra note 197, at 17-19

248. Crovitz, supra note 176, at 1056.
249. Id. at 1057 (quoting CRIMINAL Div., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES
ATTORNEYS' MANUAL § 9-100.200 (1988)); see also UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS'
MANUAL, supra note 164, § 9-110.200 for the most recent update on this
guidance.

250. Crovitz, supra note 176, at 1056.
251. Id. at 1056-58.
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reason to wonder whether these Guidelines remain in effect
or,are in abeyance, gathering dust .... ""'
A more recent sign that these guidelines will not
prevent prosecutors from imposing RICO violations on
mortgage fraud offenders is the March 2009 indictment of
defendant Darnell Bell.253 Bell and twenty-three others were
charged with "conspiracy to conduct enterprise affairs
' "The
through a pattern of racketeering activity (RICO)."254
charged racketeering activity all stems from an extensive
mortgage fraud scheme based in San Diego, California, that
involved 220 properties with a total sales price of more than
$100 million dollars. '
The case is currently being
prosecuted by two Assistant U.S. Attorneys from the
Southern District of California.256
The Bell case was not explored in detail in this
Comment because defendant Darnell Bell, the leader of the
alleged mortgage fraud scheme, is "a documented member"
of the Lincoln Park street gang.257 This creates a gray area,
as it muddles the fine lines between other organized crime
activities, the scope of RICO statutes, and mortgage fraud
enterprises. However, it provides a promising ending to this
Comment as it demonstrates the willingness of U.S.
attorneys to experiment with non-traditional prosecution
strategies under severe circumstances (i.e. the over $100
million in losses caused by mortgage fraud in the Bell case).
"This [is] the first known time in the country that
defendants in an alleged mortgage fraud scheme have been
charged in a RICO conspiracy.""

252. Id. at 1057-58.
253. Indictment, United States v. Bell, No. 3:09-cr-01209-H (S.D. Cal. filed
Mar. 27, 2009).
254. Press Release, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Twenty-Four Individuals
Charged in RICO Conspiracy Based on an Extensive Mortgage Fraud Scheme
with Properties Sold for More Than $100 Million (Apr. 7, 2009), available at
http://www.justice.gov/usao/cas/press/cas90407-BellMortgage.pdf.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Bennett, supra note 180.

